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Abstract  The global financial crisis has transformed the relationship 
between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union 
(EU). Until the crisis, the IMF had not lent to EU member states in decades, 
but now the two organisations closely coordinate their lending policies. In 
the Latvian and Romanian programmes, the IMF and the EU advocated 
different loan terms. Surprisingly, the EU embraced ‘Washington-
Consensus’-style measures more willingly than did the IMF, which much of 
the contemporary literature still portrays as an across-the-board promoter of 
orthodox macroeconomic policies. We qualify this stereotypical 
characterisation by arguing from a constructivist perspective that the degree 
of an organisation’s autonomy from its members depends on the 
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interpretation of its mandate. IMF staff viewed the Fund’s technical 
mandate as an opportunity to react rather flexibly to the challenges of the 
latest crisis. By contrast, European Commission, as well as European 
Central Bank (ECB), staff interpreted the vast body of supranational rules as 
necessitating stricter adherence to economic orthodoxy. Thus, IMF lending 
policies were more flexible and, at least on fiscal issues, also less 
contractionary. 
 
Keywords  International Monetary Fund (IMF); European 
Union (EU); European Commission; European Central Bank (ECB); 
Washington Consensus; financial crisis. 
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Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007–08 marked a formative event for both the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). The London 
G20 Summit in April 2009 reinvigorated the Fund as the foremost international 
provider of short-term liquidity, as the head of states pledged to treble its lending 
capacity to $750bn. By that time, the crisis had revealed first cracks in the dream 
of the EU as an ever-stable zone of economic prosperity. Since November 2008, 
when Hungary was the first country to demand balance-of-payment (BoP) 
assistance under a special EU facility shortly after concluding a loan arrangement 
with the IMF, joint crisis lending has been the order of the day. So far, five 
member states have followed Hungary in receiving assistance from both the EU 
and the IMF: Latvia, Romania, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (in chronological 
order, as of 30 September 2012). 
The crisis has transformed not only the IMF and the EU individually but also 
their relationship with one another. The Fund’s spectacular comeback and the 
EU’s enormous challenges combine to create a novel setting for two organisations 
whose regular interactions until recently hardly exceeded the IMF’s Article IV 
consultations with the euro area as a whole. By any standard, the IMF’s main 
occupation with European economies is unprecedented in its almost 70-year 
history. Conversely, EU member states rely heavily on external funding. 
Joint lending to European countries requires the approval of both the IMF 
Executive Board and the Economic and Financial Affairs (‘Ecofin’) Council. 
Before that approval, ‘mission teams’, which comprise IMF, European 
Commission and, occasionally, also European Central Bank (ECB) staff members, 
negotiate the terms of the loan arrangements with country authorities. When 
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Hungary, Latvia and Romania requested emergency loans in 2008–09, a puzzling 
constellation ensued that we, inspired by Alan Milward (1992), name ‘the 
European rescue of the Washington Consensus’. The ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(Williamson, 1990) has, despite various interpretations (Marangos, 2009a, 2009b), 
been associated with orthodox macroeconomic policies prescribed, among others, 
by the IMF (Babb, 2012: 2–7). Yet it was the EU, rather than the IMF, that came 
to the rescue of the Consensus in the latest financial crisis: Even though, in the 
end, the IMF Board and Ecofin approved strict loans terms, IMF staff entertained 
partly diverging policy proposals. The Fund, an ardent defender of 
macroeconomic orthodoxy up until the Asian crisis, had somewhat relaxed its 
orthodox stance on the ‘appropriate’ degree of loan conditionality; the EU, by 
contrast, emerged as an advocate of even more contractionary, or pro-cyclical, 
measures in return for loans. 
This finding of a relatively more austere EU contradicts widely held 
assumptions about the IMF’s role in the global economy. Our empirical 
observation also questions the strength of reputational concerns that make the 
Fund an enforcer of ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies in the first place (Broome, 
2008), but it updates Rawi Abdelal’s (2007: xi) finding of ‘European leadership in 
writing the liberal rules of global finance’. There is, moreover, a critical bias in 
the empirical literature when it comes to the arbitrary attribution of pro-cyclical 
monetary and fiscal policies to the – primary or sole – influence of the IMF 
(Cordero, 2009; Gabor, 2010) even when the EU was involved and promoted 
stricter loan terms. To explain this, state-centric approaches (Broz and Hawes, 
2006; Gould, 2006: ch. 5; Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Thacker, 1999) would 
purport that those ‘softer’ IMF policies reflected ‘national’ interests or domestic 
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preferences in relevant member states. But given that European states in both 
organisations expressed the same preferences, why did IMF and European 
Commission staff disagree on the design of policy programmes? 
In this article, we address this puzzle from a moderate constructivist view of 
inter- and supranational organisations as bureaucracies whose staff enjoy some 
autonomy from their members to pursue organisational objectives (on the IMF, 
see, among others, Babb, 2003; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: ch. 3). Specifically, 
we argue that the degree of autonomy depends on how an organisation interprets 
its often ambiguous mandate (see Best, 2005). The IMF’s mandate is 
predominantly technical, which its staff members construed as allowing them to 
rethink macroeconomic policies over the last decade and also in the most recent 
crisis. This stands in stark contrast to the more rule-based mandates of the 
European Commission and the ECB, as defined by the European Treaties. Against 
the backdrop of the financial crisis, supranational European actors interpreted this 
dense web of rules and norms narrowly as obliging them to implement orthodox 
macroeconomic measures. Our analysis relies on a combination of document 
analysis and personal interviews that we conducted with IMF, World Bank, 
European Commission and German Ministry of Finance representatives from 
September 2009 to July 2012.1 
The argument unfolds in three steps. First, we contrast the state-centric 
literature on crisis lending with our understanding of inter- and supranational 
organisations as bureaucracies. Second, we provide empirical evidence for the 
conflicts between the IMF and the EU over the first three joint crisis lending 
arrangements, all of which have expired by now.2 These cases exemplify the 
IMF’s greater flexibility in tackling severe economic problems in borrowing 
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countries already before the far more contentious Greek case. Third, we explain 
how the interpretation of organisational mandates in the financial crisis informed 
the diverging policy stances held by the IMF and the EU. The conclusion 
summarises our findings and considers implications for the future of (joint) crisis 
lending. 
Member state and private actor influence on crisis lending 
Member states are omnipresent actors in contemporary inter- and supranational 
organisations. As creators of organisations (‘principals’), they have delegated a 
number of tasks to organisational staff (their ‘agents’) but retain the right to 
decide on all relevant policy proposals (see Hawkins et al., 2006). In this state-
centric view, organisations invariably ‘produce’ those policies that (most of) their 
members prefer. 
State-centric approaches culminate in the claim that member states ‘call the 
shots’ in lending decisions. This familiar contention with a respectable pedigree in 
IPE is rooted in two major schools of thought. One is the realist school invoking 
‘national interests’ – read: political and economic power considerations – as the 
main determinants of IMF policies. It is typical for such accounts to focus on the 
role of the most powerful member(s) (Momani, 2004; Thacker, 1999). The other 
is the liberal school, which owes much of its intellectual core to the work of 
Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1997) on European integration. Liberal analyses regard 
organisations as acting on the preferences of key domestic constituencies (Broz 
and Hawes, 2006), or of public or private ‘supplementary financiers’ (Gould, 
2003, 2006). Some authors combine these two overlapping accounts to construct 
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multi-layered explanations (Copelovitch, 2010; Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Stone, 
2008).3 
The role of member states is indeed noteworthy in joint IMF-EU crisis lending. 
The Ecofin Council and the IMF Executive Board are tasked with decisions on 
loan arrangements and corresponding policy programmes. The EU’s internal 
agenda is mostly set by an Ecofin sub-body, the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC), through its preparation of Ecofin meetings and those of the 
Eurogroup of euro area finance ministers. EFC representatives are officials 
delegated from member states’ ministries and central banks; the Commission (DG 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘ECFIN’) and the ECB always participate in the 
sessions (Dyson and Quaglia, 2010: 765–766). The Council retains the final say 
on these matters, but the ministers tend to accept agreements between their high-
rank delegates in the EFC. 
At the IMF, formal decision-making rests with the Executive Board, which 
consists of twenty-four Directors representing either a single country or a multi-
country constituency. One of their most critical tasks is to decide on temporary 
financing for member countries (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 48). Voting rights 
correspond roughly with economic performance so that the representatives of 
richer members yield more influence over the entire decision-making process, 
including the evolution of the typical ‘consensus’ during Board meetings 
(Moschella, 2011b: 128–129). The United States, the Fund’s largest member, is 
vested with an effective veto power, as are the five largest EU member states 
(Germany, France, the U.K., Italy and Spain) combined with a voting share of 
more than 19 per cent.4 Apart from Germany, France and the U.K., all European 
members belong to several heterogeneous multi-country constituencies (Barnett 
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and Finnemore, 2004: 48). To facilitate the timely coordination of their positions 
for Board meetings, EU member state representatives at the IMF convene in an 
IMF-internal group called ‘EURIMF’, which is shadowed by ‘SCIMF’, a 
subcommittee of the EFC. Commission and ECB delegates attend EURIMF and 
SCIMF meetings (Hagan, 2009). IMF lending policies were high on the agenda of 
these groups while Executive Board decisions on European programmes were 
pending (Interviews #021 and #025: IMF country representatives). 
U.S. influence on the European programmes can be understood as indirect at 
best. During our interviews, references to its potential influence were in fact rare 
and of a general nature when they were made (Interview #010: German Finance 
Ministry staff member). There were no conflicts in these cases that our 
interviewees considered worth mentioning.5 Unconstrained by the U.S., European 
member countries at the Board succeeded in pushing through rather strict loan 
terms. The state-centric literature would explain this lack of conflict among 
European IMF members in one of two ways. 
First, in a realist reading, European policymakers share an interest in 
preventing sovereign defaults for fiscal reasons. If even a smaller economy 
defaulted on its outstanding debt, the crisis could spread quickly and trigger costly 
‘bailouts’ of financial institutions across Europe while at the same time lowering 
domestic tax revenues. Most evident is this fear of contagion in the extraordinary 
unity among the representatives of European states: although they might have 
expected to soon become borrowers themselves, even countries in financial 
distress, such as Portugal (which later followed suit with its own programme) or 
Spain (which is under no arrangement to date), did not vote against the 
programmes under discussion. 
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Second, in a liberal reading, a state’s stance on crisis lending is largely a 
function of the economic stakes of domestic constituencies or the general public. 
It is not a coincidence that Germany and France, because of their banks’ 
enormous exposures, were particularly concerned about a looming Greek 
government default, or that the U.K., because of mutual exposure, provided 
bilateral financing to Ireland (BIS, 2012).6 To protect public funds from misuse 
for ‘bailouts’ of financial firms, states and multilateral institutions alike saw 
private sector commitments as critical to containing the crisis: in 2009, the IMF 
and the European Commission, together with other multilateral institutions, 
orchestrated the European Bank Coordination Initiative (‘Vienna Initiative’), 
which was specially designed to encourage foreign banks to maintain their 
‘exposure’ through loan rollover and subsidiary recapitalisation (IMF, 2009a). 
However, these state-centric explanations cannot illuminate why the IMF and 
the European Commission favoured different lending policies in the most recent 
crisis. As we can assume that European member states communicated the same 
preferences in Washington as in Brussels, both IMF and the Commission staff 
should – in line with state-centric reasoning – have advocated similar, if not 
identical, macroeconomic policies. But this was not the case in joint lending to 
Latvia and Romania. On the contrary, IMF positions during loan negotiations 
proved more flexible and even partly less orthodox than those of the Commission. 
Our attention must thus turn to the workings within the organisations that 
‘processed’ the same preferences differently.7 
Accounts of inter- or supranational organisations as bureaucracies with 
autonomy from member states can bridge the gap between state input and 
organisational output. As a burgeoning body of constructivist scholarship 
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highlights, organisations often develop a ‘life of their own’ after having been 
delegated the authority to act on behalf of their creators (Babb, 2003, 2007; 
Barnett and Coleman, 2005; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004; Chwieroth, 2008a, 2008b; Weaver, 2007, 2008). In an 
evolutionary process, which gives them substantial autonomy, they become more 
than platforms for state interaction or ‘transmission belts’ of state preferences. As 
a result, different organisations ‘process’ the demands of their members 
differently. 
Constructivist analyses seek to understand the pathways through which the 
‘social stuff’ in an organisation drives policies in certain ways but not others. An 
organisation’s mandate is an obvious starting point. The mandate broadly defines 
an organisation’s purposes, specifies its functions and channels its activities into a 
certain direction while leaving enough ambiguity for departures from the 
established trajectory (Babb, 2003: 5–7). Though guided by these underlying 
organisational rules, staff members can broaden or narrow their meaning, which is 
never set in stone (Best, 2012b). Mandates create rough templates for 
organisational action (Babb, 2003: 17–18; see Broome and Seabrooke, 2007) and 
remain open to contextual (re-)interpretation (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 5, 
22). The IMF’s mandate, for example, has been (kept) ambiguous ever since its 
inception, which inspired competing policy interpretations of how to handle new 
or recurring ambiguities (Best, 2005, 2012a). 
Crises open even larger ‘windows of opportunity’ for political actors to re-
interpret organisational objectives than do normal times.8 We show how, in the 
latest global financial crisis, IMF and European Commission (as well as ECB) 
staff (re-)interpreted their organisational mandates in different ways, which in turn 
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shaped their specific crisis lending approaches. A broader interpretation of a 
mandate translates into more policy flexibility in crisis lending, as the IMF’s fiscal 
and monetary policy stance in joint lending with the EU illustrates. 
Cooperation and Conflict in Joint Crisis Lending 
Lending procedures 
The IMF has been in the business of crisis lending for almost seven decades now. 
Over time, the organisation has reformed or abandoned lending facilities, as well 
as creating new ones some of which pushed it far beyond its original mandate, 
most notably into joint poverty reduction operations with the World Bank. One 
facility, however, is nearly as old as the organisation itself: the Stand-By 
Arrangement (SBA) was approved by the Executive Board in 1952 and 
subsequently evolved as ‘the principal vehicle for conditionality’ (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004: 58). Hungary, Latvia and Romania all concluded lending 
arrangements with the IMF under its SBA facility. 
Not only is the SBA the IMF’s oldest loan facility (Bird, 2003: 230), the 
volumes of SBAs are also substantial. As of 31 December 2011, for example, the 
combined total amounts of all ‘active’ SBAs (measured in units of special 
drawing rights (SDRs), the Fund’s currency) were higher than those of any other 
facility – if we exclude the more voluminous but undrawn precautionary loans 
under the Flexible Credit Line (FCL).9 SBAs can last for up to thirty-six months, 
but typically their length varies between twelve and twenty-four months. The 
2009 upgrade made SBAs more flexible, particularly with regard to the option of 
precautionary access to funding, called High-Access Precautionary Arrangements 
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(HAPAs) (Moschella, 2011a). Most loan arrangements are supplemented by 
smaller amounts of supplementary financing from other public or private sources, 
which can induce additional IMF conditionality (Gould, 2003, 2006). Private 
creditors may contribute their financial share to a programme, either by rolling 
over loans (like under the ‘Vienna Initiative’) or, more drastically, by accepting 
‘haircuts’ from outstanding debt. 
The EU is not nearly as experienced a lender as the IMF. Despite a long 
tradition of ‘community loans’ dating back to the 1970s, the purpose of European 
institutions has never been supranational crisis lending on any comprehensive 
scale. Introduced with Council Regulation No 332/2002 (EC, 2002), the BoP 
facility to which EU member states yet outside of the euro area (such as Hungary, 
Latvia or Romania) can apply for financial support replaced an older facility for 
‘medium-term financial assistance’ from 1988 (EC, 1988). The previous financing 
ceiling was reduced from €16 billion to €12 billion, but in the midst of the 
financial crisis, the Council more than quadrupled the cap in two steps within less 
than six months: the volume was raised first to €25 billion in early December 
2008 and then to €50 billion in mid-May 2009 (Council of the European Union, 
2008, 2009c). The consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Art. 143 TFEU; ex Art. 119 TEC, Treaty establishing the European Community) 
entitles the European Commission to the management of BoP imbalances while 
the Council decides on the provision of ‘mutual assistance’ upon the 
Commission’s recommendation. 
With joint crisis lending come new procedures. In our three cases, the duration 
of EU BoP loans is ‘SBA-compatible’, which facilitates the alignment of lending 
operations. Similarly, even though its staff members admit to having initially 
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undertaken fewer and shorter missions, the Commission now runs quarterly 
reviews like the IMF (Interview #006: European Commission staff members and 
Acting Director). It did not take long until IMF and Commission staff went on 
formal joint missions to perform a variety of functions. At certain points, mission 
teams are temporarily sent to a member country, where they assess the viability of 
a proposed programme, review the ‘progress made’ in terms of the agreed targets, 
potentially renegotiate an existing arrangement, or complete an expiring one. In 
return for the next instalment, the country must meet the conditions set out in the 
programme. The successful completion of each quarterly review triggers the next 
payment, often – though not always – in the same quarter from both lenders; 
disbursements can be delayed in cases of noncompliance. 
New procedures can also give rise to pronounced inter-organisational friction. 
A telling example is the episode of the ‘untimely’ Hungarian negotiations efforts 
with the IMF, which revolved around the seemingly harmless question of which 
organisation EU member states have to contact first when seeking external 
financial support. At the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington in 
October 2008, the Hungarian authorities approached Fund staff, who then notified 
the Commission, in an effort to secure urgently needed financing. The order of 
requests was contrary to the shared understanding among EU member states that 
they shall inform each other and the Commission about their plans to request 
external financing, for within the Union, states have the prerogative to manage 
their own affairs (Interview #006). 
Differences occurred not only over procedures but also, more significantly, 
over policies. Borrowing countries still conclude separate loan arrangements with 
the IMF and the EU. These arrangements have similar formal parameters but are 
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not identical, as Table 1 demonstrates. The conditions on the same item10 are 
agreed between the IMF and the EU: as became abundantly clear during our 
interviews, neither side could risk being played off against the other by a 
prospective or actual borrowing country that tries to extract a better deal from the 
more accommodating lender. Substantial differences over specific policies can 
arise between the two lenders during (re-)negotiation or review phases. These 
differences have to be resolved for the two programmes to be or remain 
compatible. Conducting joint missions often merely brings about the needed level 
of compatibility between the final policy programmes. Thus, we need to 
distinguish between the lending policies of the two organisations and the resulting 
programmes that are political compromises struck between them. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Comparing IMF and EU lending policies 
A closer look at specific IMF and EU positions before the conclusion of an 
arrangement and during the programme period underlines our general observation 
of distinct macroeconomic approaches to joint crisis lending. More specifically, 
the IMF and the EU opted for different monetary and fiscal policies in the 
adjustment programmes. While the IMF and the EU readily agreed on a number 
of critical economic issues in each joint programme, there were also instances of 
substantial disagreement over how to best tackle the BoP crises in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Conflicts arose over the Latvian and Romanian programmes, but 
we have found no evidence for substantial conflicts in the Hungarian case.11 
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At the time of request for external funding, Hungary, Latvia and Romania each 
faced very unfavourable economic prospects, with their BoP imbalances 
stemming from a confluence of multiple internal and external developments (see 
IMF, 2008a, 2009h, 2009j). Latvia was further constrained institutionally through 
its membership in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), under 
which a member keeps its domestic currency fluctuating within a 15 per cent band 
relative to the common currency before acceding to the euro area; Latvia had 
committed itself to a far more rigorous scheme for its currency, the lats, of 
plus/minus 1 per cent only. Thus, almost all measures in the Latvian programme 
were aimed at upholding the currency peg to the euro. The peg was pivotal to the 
programme and a divisive issue for IMF and European Commission staff, 
informing different positions on fiscal deficit targets. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the 
most contentious issues between IMF staff on the hand and Commission staff on 
the other. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
2009 was an economically tumultuous year for Latvia. In July, the Council 
decided to open an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland and Romania under Article 104(6) (Council of the European Union, 
2009a), urging Latvia to achieve a deficit of no more than 3 per cent of GDP by 
2012 and setting a 7 January 2010 deadline for taking ‘corrective action’ (Council 
of the European Union, 2009b). While for the Council the deficit target was still 
attainable, the IMF displayed less optimism. During the first review of Latvia’s 
SBA in August 2009, IMF staff recognised the government’s extraordinary 
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difficulties in meeting the 2009 target of initially 5 per cent of GDP. IMF staff 
advocated a higher target of up to 13 per cent, acknowledging candidly that such a 
revision would entail ‘somewhat later euro adoption’ (IMF, 2009f: 26) than the 
current target date of 2014. In the end, the Latvian authorities decided to follow 
the EU’s stricter recommendation of 8.5 per cent (IMF, 2009g: 7–8), even though 
IMF staff was markedly unconvinced of the socio-economic appropriateness of 
that adjustment path (IMF, 2009f: 25–26 and esp. 67, Tab. 14).12 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Even more contentious became the IMF’s proposal of ‘unilateral euroisation’ 
(IMF, 2009h: 27, Box 21). European Central Bank and Commission officials, 
alongside the influential Eurogroup, outright rejected the idea that would have 
implied earlier euro adoption by Latvia regardless of official EU convergence 
criteria. Fearing the consequences of such a move, European authorities portrayed 
Latvia as a stepping stone to deeper European monetary integration, not least 
because it would become the first Baltic state to introduce the single currency. In 
their view, ‘rapid euro adoption’ would have had such an effect (Tumpel-
Gugerell, 2009; Interview #003: IMF country representative): 
Latvia is sticking to that peg … [I]t’s amazing how overriding an objective this is … that 
they are willing to across the board live miserably for several years to ultimately adopt the 
euro. … I mean, originally I thought, ‘Let them euroize. Can’t the ECB look the other 
way?’ … But Latvia didn’t want to do that because that would get the Europeans upset 
because they wouldn’t actually be in the eurozone … (Interview #004: IMF country 
representative). 
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The firm stance of the leading EU bodies had sizeable social consequences in 
Latvia. The authorities kept the lats within the narrow unilateral band, rather than 
allowing it to depreciate towards the more accommodating 15 per cent threshold. 
As a consequence, deep cuts in public spending were administered, including 
reductions of social expenditure. Indeed, IMF staff showed a preference for a 
longer adjustment period – potentially with unilateral euroisation – to ensure a 
sustained economic recovery with more evenly distributed social costs (Interview 
#002: IMF staff member), as well as full debt repayment. 
In the case of Romania, IMF and Commission staff disagreed over how best to 
contain the country’s fiscal deficit. The typical choice that any government faces 
in times of economic hardship is one between raising taxes and reducing public 
expenditure. As Romanian authorities pondered over the best measures for 
fulfilling the agreed objectives, the former became the more viable option. IMF 
staff showed sympathy for deficit reduction with ‘revenue measures’, as it did for 
the (unconventional) use of EU structural funds to address the country’s BoP 
problem. Also, the IMF was again willing to compromise on the length of 
adjustment period towards the omnipresent 3 per cent target to offer Romania a 
less painful route to recovery. The EU did not share, let alone support, any of 
these proposals, none of which made it into the programme (IMF, 2010d: 13; 
Interview #006; Interview #007: European Commission Director). 
Supranational European preferences came to the fore with a vengeance when 
the Romanian programme was under review. Public sector wages were to be cut 
by a staggering 25 per cent and social benefits, including pensions13, by 15 per 
cent prior to the disbursement of the third instalment (EU, 2010: 6; IMF, 2010d: 
13). The authorities later took ‘additional compensatory measures’ in their 2010 
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budget equalling 4.6 per cent of GDP to secure the fourth EU tranche (EU, 2011b: 
3), though before a revision of half the size had seemed sufficient (IMF, 2010d: 
13). But the authorities’ commitment to a deficit reduction to 3 per cent by 2012 
proved steadfast (IMF, 2010f: 2–3). 
In sum, the IMF proposed more flexible lending policies in both cases whereas 
the EU upheld many of the old orthodox principles of the Washington Consensus. 
The Fund’s macroeconomic policy stance, which had taken shape since the Asian 
crisis and become manifest elsewhere during the latest crisis, such as in Iceland, 
Belarus or Mexico (Broome, 2010), was deemed too flexible by Commission 
staff. Part of the IMF’s greater flexibility, however, results from methodological 
problems to determine quantitative programme targets, which have long been 
inherent in programmes. Revisions of initial targets may then reflect genuine 
policy flexibility and simultaneously act as ‘buffers’ for inaccurate calculations 
and estimations (Mussa and Savastano, 1999; Easterly, 2006). 
Another clarification is in order. Our preceding empirical overview shall not be 
read as suggesting that either the IMF’s or the EU’s preferences were more 
economically sensible. Rather, we intend to draw attention to the different 
understandings that IMF and Commission staff held both when programmes were 
launched and when they were reviewed. Aided by evidence from our interviews, 
we find that IMF staff advocated macroeconomic policies that were not only more 
flexible but also somewhat less contractionary than the EU’s. While this is 
certainly true of fiscal policies, the evidence is more mixed in monetary policies 
because unilateral euroisation can be as pro-cyclical a choice for a country with a 
weaker domestic currency as maintaining its peg to the euro. Moreover, the IMF’s 
new emphasis on inflation targeting has, as Daniela Gabor (2010) demonstrates, 
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merely served to legitimise well-known orthodox monetary policies (see also 
Cordero, 2009). Overall, change in IMF policies has remained piecemeal and 
inconsistent in recent years (Weisbrot et al., 2009; Ortiz, Chai and Cummins, 
2012; Grabel, 2011; see also IMF, 2009i). Our analysis, therefore, does not imply 
that IMF policies are significantly less pro-cyclical today than they were in the 
past, or even that the Fund has become a stronghold of counter-cyclical economic 
convictions. Our more modest claim is that the IMF promoted less pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies in joint programmes and was generally more flexible in its 
macroeconomic policy advice than the EU. 
Mandates as rough templates: how flexible is crisis lending? 
The IMF: tackling imbalances with a policy mix 
The IMF’s Articles of Agreement constitute the legal framework for its 
macroeconomic operations. The first article encompasses six overarching 
organisational purposes; most notable is arguably the fifth purpose, which defines 
the Fund’s chief role as a form of global credit union (Copelovitch, 2010: 50, 
fn. 52): ‘To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the 
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards …’ (Art I(v)). The 
IMF’s mandate is predominantly technical. In other words, the legal framework 
assigns to the IMF an exclusive responsibility for monetary policy, but is very 
open in not specifying derivative tasks in other policy areas. The IMF’s bilateral 
and multilateral surveillance activities are representative of this technical 
approach. The IMF conducts — usually on an annual basis — Article IV 
consultations to survey to what extent member states meet their exchange 
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arrangement obligations. These consultations shall support ‘the continuing 
development of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial 
and economic stability’ (Art. IV(1)). 
The ‘neutrality’ of the mandate gives IMF staff enormous interpretative 
latitude in deploying macroeconomic tools. Most crucially, staff enjoy relative 
discretion to design conditionality by defining what ‘adequate safeguards’ shall 
mean in loan arrangements. This is partly the result of an ambiguous mandate: the 
subject of conditionality was neither explicitly referred to in the Articles of 
Agreement nor codified in subsequent amendments (Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004: 57; Babb, 2003: 9—11, 2007: 141–142; Dell, 1981). Fund staff themselves 
contributed to this lack of more binding rules. Not even the introduction of the 
1979 Guidelines on Conditionality, which have been revised a number of times, 
increased the coherence of conditionality because staff acted against the stated 
goal of imposing fewer conditions (Babb, 2003: 11, 24, endnote 12). 
To this day, it is staff’s prerogative to initiate Executive Board proceedings. 
Executive Directors consider a written staff proposal for a certain amount of 
funding for a member country to borrow from the IMF and the conditions for it to 
meet in return. Relying on their institutional experience and communication with 
Directors, staff members from the responsible departments draft any such 
proposal based on what they expect the Board to accept; proposals are usually 
endorsed by the Board. By setting the Fund’s internal agenda, staff gain 
exceptional policy autonomy from member countries (Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004: 50; Moschella, 2011b: 128). 
But a technical mandate alone does not make for greater policy flexibility. As 
is evident from the above example of staff’s interpretation of the Guidelines, it 
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needs ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to make sense of the operational templates derived 
from organisational objectives. This frequently happens during or in the wake of 
crises. For the IMF, the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis had such an effect. Not only 
was the Fund faced with specific and more general criticisms, but it also 
experienced an unprecedented staff reduction (Broome, 2010: 38, 43–36). This 
crisis experience, as many interviewees at the IMF confirmed, set in motion a 
gradual rethink of the policy templates behind Fund operations. The latest global 
financial crisis only reinforced this process: it was perceived as just another crisis, 
albeit ‘the worst global crisis since the 1930s’ (IMF, 2009i: 3) originating in parts 
of the world that had long been spared of large-scale economic problems. As 
Manuela Moschella (2011b) documents, the Fund’s crisis response built on 
‘lagged learning’: its macroeconomic policies were ‘the cumulative effects of 
previous policy choices’ (Moschella, 2011b: 131). 
Emblematic of cumulative policy change is the Fund’s conditionality reform 
under the 2000 ‘Streamlining Initiative’. In the lead-up to the Asian crisis, the 
IMF had advocated ‘micro-conditionality’, and many of the IMF-supported 
programmes were conceived in the same vein during that crisis. In its wake, the 
IMF began to ascertain the limits of loan conditionality more thoroughly 
(Vreeland, 2007: 24–25; Interview #005: IMF country representative). The 
reorientation towards ‘macro-conditionality’ was nevertheless hesitant. According 
to a report by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO, 2007), the number 
and scope of conditions attached to loan arrangements remained extremely 
extensive until 2004. The IMF finally undertook several more reforms in line with 
the Initiative as a response to the latest crisis (Bird, 2009: 97–102). For example, 
‘structural performance criteria’ were phased out in May 2009 (IMF, 2009e). 
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Because more and more conditions, such as ‘structural benchmarks’ and unlike 
the former ‘structural’ or the extant ‘quantitative performance criteria’ (Bird, 
2009: 88, Fig. 82; IEO, 2007: 4), require no waiver from the Board in cases of 
noncompliance, staff enjoy additional discretion in its negotiations with country 
authorities (Interviews #002, #004). 
Linked to the partial reform of conditionality has been the incremental 
overhaul and diversification of lending facilities over the past six decades (see 
Bird, 2003: 231–235). This often meant larger lending volumes or easier access to 
funds. The latest trend since onset of the crisis has been precautionary lending. 
Apart from the above-mentioned easier access to precautionary SBAs (as 
HAPAs), the IMF introduced in March 2009 the FCL, an instrument aimed at 
countries that meet the pre-set qualification criteria of ‘sound’ economic 
fundamentals (‘ex-ante conditionality’). Unlike an SBA, under which 
disbursements are phased, the FCL permits countries to draw substantial sums at 
any time and even all at once. ‘Qualified’ countries14 have upfront access to the 
resources for one or two years without being subject to any ex-post evaluations; a 
mid-term eligibility review is due only for two-year arrangements. In short, FCL 
disbursements are not conditioned on future policy implementation. In addition, 
the new Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) offers lending on terms tailored 
to the needs of countries ineligible for FCL funds.15 
Ceilings on lending amounts were also raised during the crisis. When the 
Board approved the FCL, it also doubled the annual and cumulative access limits 
to 200 and 600 per cent, respectively, of a country’s quota (IMF, 2009d). 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania were all granted SBAs that exceeded – or would 
have exceeded16 – even the new ceilings by far: the respective total support 
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accounted for 1,015 per cent of Hungary’s, approximately 1,200 per cent of 
Latvia’s and approximately 1,111 per cent of Romania’s quota. Allowing 
countries to ‘overdraw’ provides for more policy flexibility during a crisis. 
The IMF has, at times, encouraged countries to balance cost-cutting measures 
with targeted social spending. This new emphasis, ‘social conditionality’ in IMF 
jargon (IMF, 2008b, 2010a), is to ensure that a basic level of social protection 
exists even in an economic crisis. It was in this spirit that the Hungarian, Latvian 
and Romanian programmes contained protective provisions for the poorest and 
most vulnerable societal groups (IMF, 2009c, 2010e, 2012). The incorporation of 
social concerns in policy programmes reveals a growing awareness within the 
Fund of the multidimensionality of economic performance: how well a country 
has weathered a crisis is no longer to be measured solely against monetary and 
fiscal achievements but also against the social effects of economic adjustments. 
While the organisation’s commitment to such reform might so far have proved 
more rhetorical than substantial, the IMF has also become much more accepting 
of the use of capital controls by countries in crisis (Grabel, 2011). 
Staff have been active to re-interpret the Fund’s mandate in many ways since 
the Asian crisis. The revised policy mix with which the IMF sought to tackle 
country imbalances was the cumulative result of staff’s many minor and major re-
interpretations of its technical mandate before and during the latest crisis. While 
staff members’ experiences as ‘everyday’ crisis managers shaped their view of the 
mandate, their re-interpretations were also grounded in some of the major 
analytical contributions of current IMF macroeconomic research. 
Through a substantial body of economic analyses, the Research Department 
has disseminated more heterodox ideas within the organisation. Led by chief 
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economist Olivier Blanchard, the department publishes widely on macroeconomic 
topics, in particular on how ‘macroprudential’ policies can be implemented. 
‘Rethinking macroeconomic policy’ (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010) 
calls for the critical reassessment of inherited monetary, fiscal and regulatory 
wisdoms. Economic instability is now increasingly seen as originating at the 
systemic rather than the microeconomic level (De Nicolò, Favara and Ratnovski, 
2012). This thinking influences the official policy framework, as evidenced by the 
Fund’s more systemic surveillance operations (Moschella, 2011b). With this in 
mind, the department engages in dialogue with economists and practitioners to 
explore new solutions to economic crises (IMF, 2011b). 
The Commission and the ECB: saving the euro with orthodox measures 
The organisational mandates of the European Commission and of the ECB are 
circumscribed by the European Treaties. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
provides that ‘[t]he Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union 
…’ (Art. 17(1)) as laid down in Art. 17(1–2): by applying EU law in general and 
its treaties in particular (‘guardian of the Treaties’17), administering the EU budget 
and representing the EU in its external relations (unless stipulated otherwise); and 
proposing legislative acts. The Commission’s mandate is thus more 
comprehensive and rule-based than the IMF’s (see also Abdelal, 2007: 208–209). 
The existence of an established body of primary, secondary and supplementary 
law, to which European institutions must adhere, confines the political leeway of 
Commission staff in BoP lending on behalf of the member states. Internal staff 
regulations convey a strong commitment to the supranational agenda (Hooghe and 
Nugent, 2006: 162), further curtailing room for autonomous Commission staff 
action. 
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As a supranational organisation, the Commission has to balance various –partly 
overlapping, partly conflicting – political agendas, ranging from health and 
consumer to monetary and fiscal policies. The comprehensiveness of a mandate 
that spans so many diverse policy areas (embodied in Commission departments 
called ‘Directorates-General’, DGs) reduces policy flexibility to quite some 
extent: while health and consumer policy might barely affect monetary policy, 
internal market or regional policy considerations are more likely to do so. In cases 
of joint lending, the Commission’s mission teams therefore include staff not only 
from ‘ECFIN’ but also from additional DGs, such as ‘COMP’ (Competition), 
‘MOVE’ (Mobility and Transport) or ‘AGRI’ (Agriculture and Rural 
Development) (Interview #030: European Commission staff member). 
The Commission is not the sole organisation to represent the European Union 
in monetary affairs. The European Central Bank, tasked with maintaining price 
stability in the euro area, has performed some unprecedented functions since the 
outbreak of the crisis. Among them has been its role as an official negotiating 
partner in programmes for euro area member states. ECB staff have joined 
Commission and IMF staff on ‘troika’ missions to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
The ECB has a precise mandate as defined by the Treaty of Maastricht. The 
Bank’s foremost task is to ensure price stability, but also to ‘support the general 
economic policies in the Union’ as long as compatible with the objective of price 
stability (Art. 127 TFEU). Given a lack of a quantitative definition, it is 
understood among European central bankers that price stability is achieved with 
an average annual inflation rate of slightly below 2 per cent (McNamara, 2006: 
179–180). This strong commitment to low inflation, underpinned by the ECB’s 
institutional independence, symbolises a ‘“stability-oriented” economic paradigm 
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that has empowered central banks’ (Dyson, 2009: 8). As a result, ‘soundness’ is 
the Holy Grail of European monetary and fiscal policy (Dyson and Quaglia, 2010: 
760). 
The most recent global financial crisis gave both Commission and Central 
Bank staff the same opportunity for re-interpreting organisational objectives as 
IMF staff. Even though the existing legal constraints left supranational European 
staff less interpretative latitude, the mandates of the Commission and the ECB 
were still open to re-interpretation. This re-interpretation, however, intensified 
monetary and fiscal orthodoxy in member states. The prevalent view in Brussels 
of the ballooning European sovereign debt crisis soon became that one could not 
go back to ‘normal’ – that is, the crisis had been caused (mostly) by domestic 
policy failures that now jeopardised European integration at large (see, for 
example, Rehn, 2010a, 2011; Trichet, 2009, 2010). Lacking compliance with 
existing rules was identified as the key obstacle to more effective crisis prevention 
and solution (Rehn, 2010b: 3). 
The main crisis lesson for Commission and ECB staff was to strengthen 
existing compliance mechanisms. Thus, they sought to reinforce financial stability 
in the euro area through incremental institutional changes to the governance 
framework (Salines, Glöckler and Truchlewski, 2012). For example, recent 
legislative initiatives by the European Commission (2011b, 2011a) focused on 
increasing compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which urges 
member states to achieve the two main fiscal goals enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty: a fiscal deficit of no more than 3 per cent and a public debt level of no 
more than 60 per cent of GDP. These proposals formed part of the ‘six-pack’ 
agenda, initiated by the Commission in 2010. Most notable is the novel, albeit 
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partial, ‘automaticity’ of sanctions for noncompliant members: states against 
which excessive deficit procedures have been opened (EU, 2011a). 
Contrast this focus on noncompliance with the previous acceptance of a 
tradition of rule bending by member states. In the 2000s, Germany – whose state 
representatives are now most outspoken about the perils of fiscal profligacy in the 
Union – and France ran excessive deficits. Nonetheless, the exposure of weak 
compliance mechanisms by the two largest members of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) already back then did not lead to a revision of the EDP. It 
was due to the enormous economic ramifications of the latest financial crisis that 
Commission staff interpreted their mandate in the way they did: towards a marked 
concern about the enforcement of existing rules to bolster the orthodox thrust of 
European economic integration. Consistent with this concern, Commission 
interpreted the implementation of pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies in 
borrowing member states as critical contributions to the overall stability of the 
Union. 
The Commission strives to implement pro-cyclical policies uniformly across 
the Union for yet another reason. Contrary to the IMF’s more case-based 
economic assessments, the Commission must establish a ‘level playing field’ in 
crisis lending, knowing that any deviation from the principle of equal treatment 
would make necessary arduous political justifications. Preferential treatment 
might deteriorate long-term political relationships within the EU — or in the 
metaphorical words of one of our interviewees: ‘The IMF comes when there is a 
fire, they work there for a while, and they fix the fire, and they leave. We have a 
history before and a history after this big crisis …’ (Interview #006). 
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The ECB’s main concern is the overall stability of the EMU. To this end, the 
ECB re-interpreted its narrow mandate in an ambiguous manner: despite, at times, 
intervening in currency markets to purchase sovereign bonds from troubled 
member states, the Central Bank supported the Commission’s call for pro-cyclical 
policies in borrowing member states. With a sense of urgency, many supranational 
actors feared that ultimately nothing less than the monetary project itself was at 
stake. Accordingly, the ECB still exerted influence where member states outside 
the euro area were concerned. For example, when speculation over an end of 
Latvia’s currency peg abounded, the ECB, though not an official part of the 
mission to the country, weighed in on the debate to prevent what it would have 
perceived as a dangerous precedent for the entire EMU (Interviews #003, #004). 
In other words, the ECB has tolerated a temporary departure from its own 
orthodox legacy, but without encouraging member states to emulate this move 
with counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies at the domestic level. The 
current debate, also within the Bank, about the conditions for members in return 
for future bond purchases is further evidence of this complementary approach. 
The Washington Consensus acts as a normative anchor for EU policymakers 
attempting to safeguard the project of European economic integration. Central to 
this supranational project is the euro; it continues to rest not on policy flexibility 
to achieve certain outputs but on the level of compliance with a narrow set of rules 
once decided to be meaningful criteria for the stability of the euro area. In the 
course of the global financial crisis, European Commission and Central Bank staff 
re-interpreted their respective mandates such that adherence to these criteria 
forces borrowing member states to implement pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal 
policies. With this narrow re-interpretation, they pursued their central goal of 
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stabilising the EMU as the institutional core of the European Union. This was in 
part a reaction to the increasingly popular mantra – voiced most prominently by 
German chancellor Angela Merkel – that Europe will fail if the euro fails. 
Conclusion 
Inter- and supranational organisations use their autonomy from member countries 
to pursue organisational objectives. Member states may address homogeneous 
material or immaterial preferences to two organisations, but these organisations 
may still not promote the same policies. The staff of one organisation tend to 
‘process’ state preferences differently from the staff of another; vague mandates 
require permanent contextual (re-)interpretations of organisational objectives and 
(re-)evaluations of policy options. 
Our analysis of joint IMF-EU lending to Central and Eastern European 
countries has illustrated this phenomenon, on which the state-centric literature on 
organisations cannot shed enough light. We have argued that IMF and European 
Commission, as well as Central Bank, staff re-interpreted organisational mandates 
in different ways in the global financial crisis. Despite the relative unity among 
the IMF’s G5 members (see Copelovitch, 2010), there was ample room for Fund 
staff to devise a more flexible crisis lending approach that, drawing on previous 
policies, was less pro-cyclical on fiscal issues. Commission and ECB staff 
certainly had less room for their re-interpretations but then chose to further 
constrain their autonomy for the sake of promoting more pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic, particularly fiscal, policies. In closing, we briefly discuss two 
major implications of our findings. 
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First, our results dispel the myth that the Washington Consensus is tied to any 
one institution or a certain set of institutions, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. Without empirical scrutiny of the cases that we have discussed, one might 
be left with the fallacious impression that the IMF once again embraced fiscal 
orthodoxy for borrowing countries when it did so less than the EU. In this sense, 
the future trajectory of the Consensus is uncertain (Babb, 2012). Second, the 
future of joint IMF-EU lending is equally uncertain and in flux. Multilateral 
cooperation, however, is likely to continue in this area, considering the sums 
already needed to keep smaller European economies afloat. 
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Notes 
1  During that period, we conducted a total of thirty nonstandardised semi-structured interviews on IMF-
EU coordination and broadly related topics. Having promised our interviewees confidentiality, we refer to the 
interviews cited herein by general anonymous labels of professional position, such as ‘IMF country 
representative’ or ‘European Commission staff member’. 
2  Romania’s first SBA (from May 2009 to March 2011) was followed up immediately by another two-
year SBA. 
3  Gould (2006: 5–13) discusses in greater detail competing theoretical explanations of loan conditionality, 
which applies to IMF policies in general. 
4  The United States holds nearly 17 per cent of the total votes. The EU member countries account for 
about 31 per cent. 
5  Unfortunately, we have to rely on oral instead of written evidence here: IMF Executive Board minutes 
become available only after five years unless ‘classified’ (IMF, 2010c: 659–660) so that those of interest have 
not yet been published. Neither the Council nor the EFC releases minutes and voting outcomes. Council 
proceedings are made public only ‘where the Council acts in its legislative capacity’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2004: Art. 7 with Art. 8–9), which does not apply to crisis lending. Likewise, the sessions of the EFC are 
subject to confidentiality according to Article 12 of its statutes (Dyson and Quaglia, 2010: 791). 
6  Latvia is another illustrative example of the consequences of debt exposure. With about as much as 
90 per cent of its outstanding loans denominated in foreign currency (IMF, 2009h: 10), it turned into an 
especially worrisome case for Sweden and other Nordic countries, which, through their banks, had become the 
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most exposed foreign creditors in the country. To avoid a currency devaluation, these countries offered bilateral 
loans to Latvia. 
7  Partly overlapping memberships point to a potential methodological problem: European countries are 
not alone at the IMF Executive Board. But as we have shown, the U.S. was rather indifferent as to the details of 
the loans to Hungary, Latvia and Romania. The remaining member countries seem to have had little leverage in 
these cases. Their biggest concern might have been that European members would get a ‘free ride’ relative to 
those countries that had previously shouldered harsh loan conditionality. 
8  See Leiteritz (2005) on how the Asian crisis affected the politics of capital account liberalisation at the 
IMF. 
9  Data available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/ 
extarr11.aspx?memberKey1=ZZZZ&date1key=2011-12-31> (accessed 13 August 2012). 
10  Still, one arrangement can impose additional conditions that the other does not include. 
11  One minor exception was IMF (2009b: 11) staff’s divergent view on Hungary’s 2009 budget: it would 
have preferred ‘a slightly higher deficit target to limit the procyclicality of fiscal policy’. 
12  It is important to note that deficit figures can belie actual fiscal policies. A simultaneous GDP 
contraction that exceeds the amount of spending cuts (in real terms) produces a larger deficit, which is not the 
same as enacting counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Moreover, the IMF’s flexibility in revising initial deficit targets 
is amplified by its (over-)optimistic growth forecasts (Gabor, 2010: 822–823). We thank one reviewer for 
clarifying these related points. 
13  Exempted were ‘pensions and allowances for those accompanying handicapped people with a first 
degree handicap’ (EU, 2010: 6). 
14  To date, Colombia, Mexico and Poland have subscribed to the FCL. 
15  The PLL was launched in November 2011 as a replacement of the similarly designed Precautionary 
Credit Line (PCL), which had been in existence for just over a year (IMF, 2010b, 2011a). 
16  The loan arrangements with Hungary and Latvia were concluded (under the Emergency Finance 
Mechanism for ‘rapid assistance’) before the decision on access limits. 
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17  The European Treaties, or ‘primary EU law’, do not constitute the only source of legal obligations for 
the Commission and the Central Bank. Other obligations (‘secondary law’) are derived from these Treaties, as 
well as from stipulations that lay outside the Treaties (‘supplementary law’; see 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14534_en.htm>, accessed 
8 August 2012). 
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Tables 
TABLE 1.   Key features of the original IMF-EU loan arrangements with Hungary, Latvia and 
Romania 
 Hungary Latvia Romania 
Sum total 
(in billions of €) 
20.00 7.50 19.95 
IMF 12.50 
(62.5 %) 
1.70 
(22.7 %) 
12.95 
(64.9 %) 
EU 6.50 
(32.5 %) 
3.10 
(41.3 %) 
5.00 
(25.1 %) 
World Bank 1.00 
(5.0 %) 
0.40 
(5.3 %) 
1.00 
(5.0 %) 
Other multilateral 
institutions 
— 
 
0.10a 
(1.3 %) 
1.00c 
(5.0 %) 
Individual countries — 
 
2.20 
(29.3 %) 
— 
 
    
Duration 
(first and last 
instalments) 
   
IMF Q4 2008–Q1 2010 Q4 2008–Q1 2011 Q2 2009–Q1 2011 
EU Q4 2008–Q4 2009 Q1 2009–Q1 2011 Q2 2009–Q2 2011 
    
Number of instalments    
IMF 6 10 8 
EU 4 6 5 
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Notes: All of the parameters refer to the original IMF and EU loan arrangements, irrespective of later deviations 
from the original agreement, especially delays in disbursements and rescheduling activities. Unlike the IMF, 
the EU does not habitually disburse its instalments on a quarterly basis. As some quarters are skipped, EU 
loans feature a lower number of instalments in each case. This might amount to a single pause as in the case 
of Hungary (no scheduled instalment in Q3 2009); extreme front-loading as in the case of Latvia (no 
instalments in Q1 2010, Q2 2010 and Q4 2010); or semi-annual disbursements as in the case of Romania (no 
instalments in Q3 2009, Q1 2010, Q3 2010 and Q1 2011). All figures, including the percentages, are rounded 
to one decimal point. 
a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
b Czech Republic (€0.2 bn), Poland (€ 0.1 bn), Estonia (€ 0.1 bn); Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland 
(together €1.8 bn). 
c EBRD, European Investment Bank (EIB) and International Finance Corporation (IFC, which is not 
mentioned in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and Romania’). 
Sources: Data compiled from the original programme documents by the IMF (requests for SBAs with Executive 
Board decisions; Letters of Intent, LoIs) and the EU (Memoranda of Understanding, MoUs). 
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TABLE 2.   Disagreements over fiscal deficit targets (in % of GDP) 
 Hungary Latvia Romania 
 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Initial target 2.6* 3.8 3.0 5.3 5.0 3.0 5.1 4.1 3.0 
   revised to 
(2.9) 
3.9 
  10.0 8.5 (6.0) 
4.5 
7.8 (6.4) 
7.3 
5.0 
IMF’s preference*    13.0 12.0 9.5    
 
Notes: 
 Deficit targets and revisions are represented on an accrual basis in ESA95 (European System of Accountants) 
terms. A revision that was ‘undone’ through a subsequent one is in round brackets. 
* Where explicitly stated in an alternative ‘programme scenario’. For these figures, the IMF (2009f: 25, fn. 6, 
67, Tab. 1) employs a cash deficit concept. As its use tends to yield slightly stricter – that is, lower – targets 
than ESA-based calculations, numerical deviations in the agreed targets for the same borrowing country are 
due to the choice of methodology. That the original document on the Hungarian SBA, as well as the 
country’s LoI, mentions a target of 2.5 % on an ESA basis was apparently a typing error, which was 
corrected with the first review. 
Sources: Data compiled from various programme documents by the IMF (LoIs; requests for SBAs and reviews) 
and the EU ((Supplemental) Memoranda of Understanding). 
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TABLE 3.   Major lines of conflict over the Latvian and Romanian programmes 
 IMF position EU position 
   
Latvia Deficit target of 13 % of GDP in 
2009; 3 % target to be achieved by 
2014 
 
Devaluation of Latvian currency 
advisable; euroisation or later euro 
adoption despite ERM II 
framework 
Deficit target of 8.5 % of GDP in 
2009; 3 % target by 2012 
 
 
Peg to be kept; no euro introduction 
without compliance with 
Maastricht criteria 
   
Romania Fiscal adjustment to be ‘drawn out’ if 
economically necessary 
 
Greater use of ‘revenue measures’ 
 
 
EU structural funds potentially 
instrumental in addressing BoP 
imbalances 
 
Deficit target of 3 % to be achieved 
as early as possible 
 
Public expenditure cuts preferable to 
tax increases 
 
No use of structural funds for 
addressing BoP imbalances 
(especially because of insufficient 
‘absorption capacities’) 
 
Sources: IMF, EU (see Tables 1 and 2 above); authors’ interviews. 
